How could PCGS miss this artificial toning here

BlackberryPie · Sep 5, 2021

cplradar said: ↑

Yeah - that is not true. So sorry - you loose. There doesn't have to be ANY agreement, only evidence that it affects the market value fraudulently, and that is EASY to prove in a court and generally agreed upon and written by experts everywhere, including the TPGs themselves.

So quit making crap up. This idea that you push, that the details of the fraudulent act has to be explicitly predefined in the statute is STUPID and insults our intelligence.
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It actually only insults your perceived intelligence of what you believe to be facts.

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cplradar · Sep 5, 2021

BlackberryPie said: ↑

It actually only insults your perceived intelligence of what you believe to be facts.
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Hey troll, how is it that you never add anything to the thread?

cplradar · Sep 5, 2021

https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca/downloads/pdf/about/ConsumerProtectionLawPacket.pdf

NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODETITLE 20: CONSUMER AFFAIRSCHAPTER 5: UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICESSUBCHAPTER 1: CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW§ 20-700. Unfair Trade Practices Prohibited. No person shall engage in any deceptive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental, or loan or in the offering for sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the collection of consumer debts.§ 20-701. Definitions.a.Deceptive trade practice. Any false, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any kind made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan or in connection with the offering for sale, lease, rental, or loan of consumer goods or services, or in the extension of consumer credit or in the collection of consumer debts, which has the capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers. Deceptive trade practices include but are not limited to: (1) representations that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have; the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he or she does not have; goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or secondhand; or, goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model, if they are of another; (2) the use, in any oral or written representation, of exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact or failure to state a material fact if such use deceives or tends to deceive; (3) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representations of material facts; (4) offering goods or services with intent not to sell them as offered; (5) offering goods or services with intent not to supply reasonable expectable public demand, unless the offer discloses to limitation of quantity; and (6) making false or misleading representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions, or price in comparison to prices of competitors or one's own price at a past or future time; (7) stating that a consumer transaction involves consumer rights, remedies or obligations that it does not involve; (8) stating that services, replacements or repairs are needed if they are not; and (9) falsely stating the reasons for offering or supplying goods or services at scale discount prices.
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cplradar · Sep 5, 2021

https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1606941/garrett-v-bankwest-inc/?court_alacrimapp=on

BREACH OF DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH
Garrett claims that the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment for BankWest and Lynass on the issue of a breach of an implied duty to act in good faith "and to refrain from doing anything that will injure the rights of the other party to receive the benefits of their agreement." This claim is made under both a common law duty and an obligation imposed by statute. Garrett further alleges that BankWest and Lynass have, apart from the contract, an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of this duty gives rise to an independent cause of action in tort.

Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which prohibits either contracting party from preventing or injuring the other party's right to receive the agreed benefits of the contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205 (1981).[7] 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 541, at 97 (1960); 5 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 670, at 159 (3rd Ed.1961). A majority of American jurisdictions recognize a duty to perform a contract in good faith. See Burton, Breach of Contract And the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harvard L.Rev. 369 (1980). The concept is written into the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 1-203 which is set forth in SDCL 57A-1-203:

Every contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
"Good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." SDCL 57A-1-201(19).

The application of this implied covenant allows an aggrieved party to sue for breach of contract when the other contracting party, by his lack of good faith, limited or completely prevented the aggrieved party from receiving the expected benefits of the bargain. A breach of contract claim is allowed even though the conduct failed to violate any of the express terms of the contract agreed to by the parties. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va.L.Rev. 195 (1968); Burton, Breach of Contract And the Common Law Duty To Perform In Good Faith, supra; e.g., Shaw v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 126 Vt. 206, 226 A.2d 903 (1967).
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cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

https://ujs.sd.gov/Supreme_Court/opiniondetail.aspx?ID=1458

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

[¶8.] We begin our analysis with Judge Kean’s landmark opinion in Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 NW2d 833 (SD 1990). There, this Court held for the first time that “[e]very contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which prohibits either contracting party from preventing or injuring the other party’s right to receive the agreed benefits of the contract.” Id. at 841. Definitions of good faith were taken from the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981). Id. Good faith is defined as “‘honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’” Id. (quoting SDCL 57A-1-20(19)); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981). See also Mahan v. Avera St. Lukes, 2001 SD 9, ¶¶30-31, 621 NW2d 150, 159-60; Nelson v. WEB Water Dev. Ass’n, Inc., 507 NW2d 691, 698 (SD 1993). “Good faith is derived from the transaction and conduct of the parties. Its meaning varies with the context and emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.” Garrett, 459 NW2d at 841 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, cmt. a (1981)).

[¶9.] The Dougans argue that FCS breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to grant them an extension until October 1, 2002, in order to make the first payment on their real estate note (Note 201). They contend that, had FCS extended the due date as they requested, rather than only granting a sixty-day extension to May 1, 2001, they would have been able to adequately perform their obligations. Without more, this cannot constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. When the express provisions of the loan documents required timely installment payments and no provision entitled the borrowers to extensions as a matter of right, there can be no breach of the implied covenant. This was essentially the holding in Garrett, 459 NW2d at 847. The covenant of good faith does not create an amorphous companion contract with latent provisions to stand at odds with or in modification of the express language of the parties’ agreement. It is not a repository of limitless duties and obligations. See id. at 841.

[¶10.] Other courts have held likewise. Good faith has “‘nothing to do with the enforcement of terms actually negotiated’ and therefore cannot ‘block use of terms that actually appear in the contract.’” Taylor Equip., Inc. v. John Deere Co., 98 F3d 1028, 1032 (8thCir 1996) (quoting Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F2d 701, 705 (7thCir 1992), cert. denied, 506 US 1035 (1992)). If the express language of a contract addresses an issue, then there is no need to construe intent or supply implied terms. Id. (citing Cambee’s Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F2d 167, 175 n 13 (8thCir 1987) (applying South Dakota law)).

Although courts often refer to the obligation of good faith that exists in every contractual relation, . . . this is not an invitation to the court to decide whether one party ought to have exercised privileges expressly reserved in the document. “Good faith” is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties. When the contract is silent, principles of good faith . . . fill the gap. They do not block use of terms that actually appear in the contract.

Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F2d 1351, 1357 (7thCir 1990) (internal citations omitted).

[¶11.] The Dougans entered into a separate amended loan contract allowing one extension and requiring timely payments thereafter. By the terms of their agreement, the Dougans were made aware of the potential consequences if the amended agreement was not adhered to. FCS, therefore, could not have been acting in bad faith in pursuing its contractually permitted rights. See Uptown Heights Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Seafirst Corp., 891 P2d 639, 645-46 (Or 1995).

[¶12.] As part of their bad faith claim, the Dougans argue that in September 2002, FCS misapplied their payments. It appears from our review of the record, however, that Dan Dougan agreed that the payments could be so applied. In his deposition, he testified:

Q. Now, the first three words here say [referring to FCS’s letter to his attorney], “As we agreed, I applied the proceeds.” Did you agree that that’s how the proceeds could be applied?

A. Well, I really didn’t – yes.

In any event, a clause of the loan documents provides: “Any amounts submitted by [the Dougans] will, at lender’s option, be applied first to the payment of default interest, then to protective advances and fees, then to accrued interest, and finally to principal to the extent of the amount submitted.” Thus, the substantive language of the loan agreement gave FCS discretion on where to apply payments. “‘[T]he obligation of good faith does not vary the substantive terms of the bargain, . . . nor does it provide a remedy for an unpleasantly motivated act that is expressly permitted by contract.’” Seafirst, 891 P2d at 643 (citations omitted). Good faith honors a party’s “justified expectations.” Garrett, 459 NW2d at 841 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F2d at 1357. To hold otherwise, would jeopardize “the institution of contract[.]” Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F2d at 1357 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 901 F2d 765 (9thCir 1990)). Use of remedies expressly provided for in a contract will not give rise to a claim for breach of good faith. See Mahan, 2001 SD 9, ¶32, 621 NW2d at 160; Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach, 9 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 107 (1986).

[¶13.] Even if their payments were applied incorrectly, as they believe, the Dougans do not dispute that they were still not able to bring their loan payments current and they would still have been in default. But the Dougans argue that their farming and ranching operations were interfered with under the loan agreement when FCS shut off Note 101’s revolving line of credit. This decision, they contend, prevented them from proceeding with their harvest and horse sales. They argue that because FCS’s discretion could not be absolute, its conduct prevented them from making adequate payments and was a breach of good faith. Under the terms of the agreement, however, “Lender, at its option, may advance sums to Maker(s) as a revolving line of credit . . . .” (emphasis added). Discretion was vested in the express terms of the contract. The Dougans were delinquent with their payments on other notes. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed, “Banks sometimes bind themselves to make loans (commitment letters and letters of credit have this effect) and sometimes reserve the right to terminate further advances. Courts may not convert one form of contract into the other after the fact, without raising the cost of credit or jeopardizing its availability.” Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F2d at 1356-57. Here, FCS was acting within the terms of the contract. In entering into the credit agreement with FCS, the Dougans agreed to the possibility that funds may not be advanced at the option of FCS. “Performance of a contract according to its terms cannot be characterized as bad faith.” Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 SW2d 684, 687 (Tenn 1996).

[¶14.] In the Dougans’ view, a jury question exists on whether FCS was reasonable in declining to extend the loan payment, in failing to extend more credit, and in later foreclosing. The term “reasonableness” is used in the Restatement to illustrate types of bad faith.

Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving “bad faith” because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (emphasis added). Thus, the Dougans argue that FCS, acting without any legitimate commercial need, unreasonably refused to provide a longer extension date until the wheat was harvested and a horse sale took place. After all, they insist, FCS was never in danger of losing its security: “FCS was foreclosing and liquidating on assets FCS valued at $2,563,983, with equity valued by FCS at $1,588,783, all because [the] Dougans were short $15,000 from having all payments made in a severe drought year.” But as the Oregon Supreme Court held, “[t]he loan agreement . . . authorizes foreclosure for any default, not merely for a default that jeopardizes security.” Seafirst, 891 P2d at 647. There, the court ruled that the borrower’s claim based on the implied covenant of good faith was without merit under contract terms that expressly provided for the lender’s remedies. Here, the Dougans’ loan agreement with FCS provided:

If any principal, interest, or advance is past due, regardless of the length of time, or if there is any failure to comply with any covenant, condition, or agreement contained in this Note, in any loan agreement, or in any mortgage, trust deed, security agreement, or other document given to secure payment of this Note, then, at the election of the holder hereof, all principal, all accrued interest thereon, and all advances will become immediately due . . . .

The loan documents provided no exculpatory clauses forgiving untimely payments in certain circumstances and the record is void of any suggestion that the Dougans requested or bargained for any. Absent an unconscionable provision, the concept of “reasonableness” will not modify contract terms.

[¶15.] The Dougans contend that FCS was over secured, taking into account the value of the real and personal property FCS held as security. Again, however, the loan documents provide no intimation that an untimely payment would be waived if the collateral exceeded the amount of the indebtedness. Under Garrett, we “should not require a [lender] to totally disregard its own interests and compel it to place itself in a worse position when neither the contract nor the requirement of good faith demand such action.” 459 NW2d at 847; First Bank of South Dakota v. VonEye, 425 NW2d 630, 637 (SD 1988). “A bank is not an investor, but rather a lender with the right to define and limit the risks it will accept.” VonEye, 425 NW2d at 637 (citation omitted). FCS followed the explicit terms of its bargained for promise.

[¶16.] We think it also noteworthy that the Dougans declined to avail themselves of their contractual and legal remedies. FCS only commenced foreclosure after notifying the Dougans of their opportunity to mediate or restructure their loan payments. “The doctrine of waiver is applicable where one in possession of any right, whether conferred by law or by contract, and with a full knowledge of the material facts, does or forebears the doing of something inconsistent with the exercise of the right.” Hammerquist v. Warburton, 458 NW2d 773, 778 (SD 1990). In this commercial transaction, “‘it does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves.’” Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F2d at 1357 (quoting James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F2d 344, 346 (2dCir 1933)).

[¶17.] When their financial circumstances became difficult, the Dougans may have expected more from their banking relationship, but whatever solutions and remedies both parties were entitled to had already been provided through the explicit terms of the contract. “Any attempt to add an overlay of ‘just cause’ . . . to the exercise of contractual privileges would reduce commercial certainty and breed costly litigation.” Id.

[¶18.] Lastly, the Dougans make much of the circuit court’s comments from the bench. Even while he was dismissing the case, the judge nonetheless remarked that he thought the conduct of FCS was “unreasonable.” The Dougans cited this remark in their briefs and in oral argument to illustrate that the court’s reasoning was contradictory on the question of bad faith. Because we take an independent review of the record, we are not bound by the circuit judge’s factual assessments in granting summary judgment. Fritzel v. Roy Johnson Constr., 1999 SD 59, ¶7, 594 NW2d 336, 338 (citing Spenner v. City of Sioux Falls, 1998 SD 56, ¶7, 580 NW2d 606, 609 (citation omitted)). From our review of the transcript, we see that the court alluded to no particular event in its comment, thus we are at a loss to know exactly what was meant. Perhaps the judge believed FCS should have been more forbearing even if its contract entitled it to act as it did. If that was the court’s meaning, we express no view on it since we conclude as a matter of law that FCS did not breach its loan agreement or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in proceeding in accord with the terms of the loan documents. The Dougans detail other factual issues to support their argument, but these lack sufficient merit for discussion.

[¶19.] As the circuit judge aptly phrased it, “the Dougans are asking in their counterclaim for a better bargain than they agreed to.” Indeed, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ensures that contracting parties get the full benefit of their bargain, but no more. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for FCS on the counterclaim.

[¶20.] Affirmed.

[¶21.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.
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ToughCOINS · Sep 6, 2021

cplradar said: ↑

. . . No coin that you buy from him can be trusted to be anything OTHER than an artificially tones coin.
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Be careful, as such a broad-brush statement is not only inaccurate. It is libelous.

Lehigh96 · Sep 6, 2021

gmarguli said: ↑

There really is no such thing as AT or NT. There is only market acceptable and market unacceptable.

Intent and process do not matter. You can't tell either of these just looking at the coin. You can only look at the end result. Is the toning acceptable in the marketplace?
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Greg, the problem is that Doug has been telling everyone on this forum that "intent" is the divider between AT and NT for decades, and as a result you have hundreds, maybe thousands of members of this forum who don't understand what you just posted is 100% true.

The graders at the TPGs have no information about the storage conditions of the coin, they can only judge the coin by what they see and decide whether the toning in market acceptable based on the traditional color schemes and patterns that typically present for that series of coin.

Lehigh96 · Sep 6, 2021

cplradar said: ↑

Intent is what it is all about, but destroying the coin(s) also sucks, and conning the buyer is likely even criminal. So intention is clearly cental to the issue and YES you can most often determine the intention when you look for the evidence in the coin. It is not the only evidence, but it is, without doubt, the most logical place to find evidence, and one can often find a great deal of evidence in the coin. I am pretty sure the foresic labs at the museum can catch forgeries that PCGS would never find. There is almost always a chemical signatures of one sort or the other if enough effort is put into finding it. PCGS is not investing 50K - 200K USD in finding a forgery in $200, nor do they have the equiptment. For them, it is a marketing and legal issue.
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Intent has nothing to do with it, because the TPG graders have no information about the storage conditions of the coin, they only see the end result.

The original purpose of artificially toning coins was to hide flaws in hope that the grader would assign a higher grade to the coin, garnering a higher value for the coin. Under your definition, that would constitute fraud because it is intentional. The problem is that a coin can tone naturally and hide flaws just as easily. How would you ever prove that the coin was artificially toned in a short period of time rather than naturally toned over a long period of time. Short answer, you can't, and neither can the TPGs. The term "market acceptable" basically means "their best guess."

Once rainbow toned coins started driving significant premiums in the marketplace due to their eye appeal, coin doctors started trying to replicate that same rainbow toning by artificially toning coins to drive similar premiums. That said, you still have the exact same problem, you will never have definitive proof that a coin was artificially toned, just the graders best guess. This is evidenced by the fact that some coins with the same toning patterns and color schemes are graded by the TPG as "market acceptable" while other coins with the same toning pattern and color scheme are rejected for questionable color. As @gmarguli pointed out several times, the experts (TPG graders) can't agree on what constitutes AT, then you have absolutely zero chance of proving that in court.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

Be careful, as such a broad-brush statement is not only inaccurate. It is libelous.
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With that much evidence in plain site, I wouldn't be a concern, and I can't be quelled by such an implied threat. It wouldn't get past the first stage of a NYS or a US court.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

Be careful, as such a broad-brush statement is not only inaccurate. It is libelous.
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https://newrepublic.com/article/91900/mary-mccarthy-lillian-hellman-libel-suit

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

Lehigh96 said: ↑

Intent has nothing to do with it, because the TPG graders have no information about the storage conditions of the coin, they only see the end result.
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Both of those matters are false. You simply haven't seen what we do at the museum to determine if a work of art is fraud. The problem is the time and cost. And some methods can be destructive, like taking samples of the coin and examining it under an electronic microscope. I suggest, however, for reference that you review the work done with the Rembrandt Research Project, as a starting point, and to understand that in fact, in most cases, the artifact has sufficient evidence to determine if it has been fraudulently altered, misatrributed, or tampered with, and the techniques used to create the illusion. These techniques for exmining works can be applied readily to artificial toning.

Secondly, TPGers are certifying the authenticity of the coin, with a guarantee I might add. They can and need to stop cutting corners and getting serious about it and that starts with obtaining an oral history of the coin. It they can't get a rational explanation, they should be slabbing all of them as detailed coins, damaged.

If they din't ASK how it is that such a coin became so toned then they failed in their most basic task.

Lastly, AT and NT toning CAN be all about intent, in terms of the law. The law is clear that intent is everything in determining fraud. Artificially toning a coin to jack up the price is fraud. It is altering a product AND mis-attributing it in order to make a financial gain. That is FRAUD in most, if not all states. It is ALL about intent.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

Lehigh96 said: ↑

As @gmarguli pointed out several times, the experts (TPG graders) can't agree on what constitutes AT, then you have absolutely zero chance of proving that in court.
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yeah - don't bet on that.

BTW - under those conditions, to say that faced with a broad group of coins that the TPGs can not determine if the coins are AT or NT, then it is incumbent upon them to actually say that on the label or to pass on the grading, which brings us to the FIRST question of the thread... how it is that PCGS can grade and slab such a coin?

ToughCOINS · Sep 6, 2021

cplradar said: ↑

https://newrepublic.com/article/91900/mary-mccarthy-lillian-hellman-libel-suit

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I don't disagree that there are a number of coins in the seller's inventory exhibiting what I would characterize as contrived toning, but I can assure you that many of the coins listed in that seller's eBay store look just like countless coins that I've personally removed from mint packaging after buying them from long time collections. So much for your statement, "No coin that you buy from him can be trusted to be anything OTHER than an artificially tones coin."

If I were asked to testify in court that every one of the coins this seller was offering in his eBay store on this day was artificially toned (or accelerated), my reply would be an earnest and wholehearted "NO".

If you have the same chutzpah and deep pockets Hellman had to bring such an exhausting, resource-depletive lawsuit, go ahead and sue the TPG's.

Otherwise, accept that the market embraces their experiential judgment of NT versus AT. They're wrong about grades more than they are about toning, and that's the sword to fall on, if any.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

"No coin that you buy from him can be trusted to be anything OTHER than an artificially tones coin."

If I were asked to testify in court that every one of the coins this seller was offering in his eBay store on this day was artificially toned (or accelerated), my reply would be an earnest and wholehearted "NO".
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I don't disagree with any of that, except, see that is how lawsuites work and how the law is applied. It all depends on the question and how the Jury interprets things.

Faced with the question, "Sir, in your opinion, can any of the coins in that users sale case be attributed to standard toning and be legitimate and natural coins in a natural state, as understood by the accepted Numismatic standards and in the market place" - then yes. You are correct and you answer that correctly. It is an absolute question and it needs an edge case answer.

However, when faced with a seller who broadly attempts to sell AT coins, it would be ignorant to expect that any of his coins are NT. So the question:

"Sir, would you trust that any of the coins in this sellers show case are naturally and untampered with coins, as understood by the accepted Numismatic standards and in the market place", you can honestly answer that, even under oath, as no. All of these coins fall under suspected because of their association with this seller.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

Otherwise, accept that the market embraces their experiential judgment of NT versus AT. They're wrong about grades more than they are about toning, and that's the sword to fall on, if any.
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That is an interesting question that I can not answer. The other thread asked how many AT coins are now in the market? It would seem a lot.

ldhair · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

Be careful, as such a broad-brush statement is not only inaccurate. It is libelous.
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Good thing he has a lawyer in the family. If the seller catches wind of all he has posted in these threads, he will need a lawyer. Any lawyer that is worth a darn is going to question why he posted such libelous words on a public forum.
The good news is that all the lawyers will be happy, they get paid, win or loose.

ToughCOINS · Sep 6, 2021

cplradar said: ↑

. . . when faced with a seller who broadly attempts to sell AT coins, it would be ignorant to expect that any of his coins are NT. So the question:

"Sir, would you trust that any of the coins in this sellers show case are naturally and untampered with coins, as understood by the accepted Numismatic standards and in the market place", you can honestly answer that, even under oath, as no. All of these coins fall under suspected because of their association with this seller.
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I think you are wrong here.

A suitable expert witness should not associate all coins subject to the question asked with each other, or with the seller’s purported reputation, much the same as one would not necessarily assume all coins to be fake in the case of a known seller of counterfeits. That’s the fundamental reason for not hiring novices as witnesses. Their expertise is relied upon for differentiation of examples in support of the case being made.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

I think you are wrong here.

A suitable expert witness should not associate all coins subject to the question asked with each other, or with the seller’s purported reputation,
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This is really established business law Regardless of the expertise of any witness, a testimony or evidence of repeated fraud renders all his goods as suspent unless specific proof can be brought that a specific item is not altered. This is business tort, not criminal fraud which is a different issue.

ToughCOINS said: ↑

as one would not necessarily assume all coins to be fake in the case of a known seller of counterfeits.
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SURE you would under business tort and civil law. Criminal law has different standards. Once it is established that an illegal business practice has happened, it is not up to the court to go through every piece of merchandise and separate them, if it possible.

More to the point that you made, within a market, if someone is known to make forgies, all his work and product is tainted as fraudulent work and has to be stated as such if resold. Often art is sold, This is a forged Van Gogh from the master Forger of Spain (btw this is a real example), and people buy it, which is FINE.

But you can't say that a known perpetrator of AT business fraud has coins on ebay, and we therefore have to view each coin separately. Maybe some aren't AT. NO. That is not how pedigree and business law works. All the coins are now suspected forgeries and need to be sold as such, otherwise you, the seller is libel.

There are no civil rights for coins. If you find a batch of coins which are in the stock of an AT forgerier, and you buy the lot of them, any of them are toned are considered AT forgeries, and you need to disclose that origin in the sale and descriptions of the coins. You need to disclose, "this coin was part of a lot purchased from the Master AT forger of Monsey, Yodel Yankel", otherwise you are libel to the client if they find out. And this will be all hashed out in court.

You can't see a coin that you believe is AT and ship it off to a TPG like it s a lottery ticket. YOU CERTAINLY CAN'T AT a coin and do that. That is openly fraud. THAT is, in of itself, a violation of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, principle that is upheld universally in business law.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

A suitable expert witness should not associate all coins subject to the question asked with each other
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FWIW - a suitable expert would know the pedigree of the coins, and ask such question and disclose them. If you view that as a left handed slap at the TPGers, and those that promote them as safe arbiters of authenticity and grading, then yeah, but I am left handed. Looking at these examples, one obviously can not trust the TPGer for accurate assesment of AT. That being said, one should't just discard their opinion either. Regardless, there error rate is very high and they have economic incentive to allow a certain amount of AT coins to slide through the system.

cplradar · Sep 6, 2021

ToughCOINS said: ↑

A suitable expert witness should not associate all coins subject to the question asked with each other, or with the seller’s purported reputation
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FWIW - who says this? For art, and coins are art, an expert who doesn't know the pedigree of an object and doesn't inquire about it, is not expert at all. You don't know anything about an object if you don't know its history. Every object in a musuem and reputable deals has an aquesition note and pedigree notation.

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How could PCGS miss this artificial toning here

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How could PCGS miss this artificial toning here

BlackberryPie I like pie

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cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

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Lehigh96 Toning Enthusiast

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cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

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cplradar Talmud Chuchum

cplradar Talmud Chuchum

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cplradar Talmud Chuchum

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